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Hopefully Enduring: How North Carolina’s Divorce
Laws Violate the First Amendment
Maren H. Lowrey*

ABSTRACT
The phrase “til death do us part” is both poetic and aspirational. It is
the ubiquitous vow Americans make to one another when they marry1
and embark on what is “hopefully enduring.”2 But life does not always
meet the aspirational marks we set and that is most true in the context of
marriage and divorce. Each state enjoys nearly exclusive control over
this intimate relationship, which results in different regulatory schemes
across the United States.3 Changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence over
* Ms. Lowrey is a third-year law student at Campbell University Law School.
She holds a B.S. in International Law and Comparative Legal Studies from the
United States Military Academy at West Point. Prior to starting law school, Ms.
Lowrey was a commissioned Aviation Officer in the United States Army.
A special thank you to Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz, Professor of Law at
UCLA School of Law, for his feedback on this comment. Additionally, thank
you to Associate Professor Anthony Ghiotto and Professor Lisa Lukasik at
Campbell University School of Law for their assistance in brainstorming,
researching, and editing this piece.
1
Caralynn Lippo, Why We Say “Until Death Do Us Part” In Wedding Vows,
REDBOOK (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.redbookmag.com/lovesex/relationships/a49934/until-death-do-us-part-wedding-vowsorigin/#:~:text=The%20oldest%20standard%20wedding%20vows,to%20love%
2C%20cherish%2C%20and%20to.
2
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“We deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”) (emphasis
added).
3
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“The power of the States over marriage and divorce is, of course, complete
except as limited by specific constitutional provisions.”); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“The durational residency requirement under attack in this
case is a part of Iowa’s comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic
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time ensured state regulation of marriage did not run afoul of the
Constitution.4 These decisions found marriage to be a fundamental right
under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Court addressed the issue of
divorce in the same context.6 But the Court has yet to squarely address
the issue of marriage and divorce under the First Amendment. Divorce
might very well be a fundamental right under a similar substantive due
process analysis, but that is not the only potential source of its
constitutional protection.7 This comment provides the framework to
argue that North Carolina’s year-long separation requirement is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it violates an
individual’s right to freedom of expressive association, freedom of
intimate association, and freedom from compelled speech.
Introduction .......................................................................................... 114
North Carolina divorce law and The Supreme Court’s Current
Jurisprudence on Marriage and Divorce ............................................... 116
A.

North Carolina’s Current Statutory Scheme of Divorce Laws ... 117

B.

The Separation Justification ...................................................... 118

C.

The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Marriage and Divorce 119

Freedom of expressive association ....................................................... 120
A.

Freedom of Expressive Association Defined ............................. 120

B.

Freedom of Expressive Association Applied ............................. 121

C.

Freedom of Expressive Association and Divorce ...................... 129

relations, an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of
the States.”).
4
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1971); see also Sosna, 419 U.S. at
404; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); see also Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 645 (2015).
5
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
6
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 (holding a Connecticut divorce law unconstitutional
per the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the law denied
access to the courts based on an inability to pay fees).
7
See Cathy J. Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some
Unanswered Questions, 63 WASH. U. L. REV. 577, 579-588 (1985); see also
Elizabeth Horowitz, The “Holey” Bonds of Matrimony: A Constitutional
Challenge to Burdensome Divorce Laws, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 877, 879 (2006).
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D. North Carolina’s Divorce Law Infringes on the Freedom of
Expressive Association Because it Impermissibly Forces Inclusion .. 132
E. What are the Potential Limits to Expressive Association Rights? . 132
Freedom of Intimate Association.......................................................... 132
A. Freedom of Intimate Association Defined .................................... 132
B. Freedom of Intimate Association Applied .................................... 134
C. Freedom of Intimate Association and Divorce in North Carolina . 136
Freedom From Compelled Speech........................................................ 138
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Freedom from Compelled Speech Defined............................... 138
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New Romantic Relationships or Marriages........................... 145
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Speech of a Separated Spouse is the Speech of the Other... 146

What Standard of Scrutiny is Appropriate to Apply to Constitutional
Challenges to Divorce Laws?................................................................. 147
A. Because Divorce Implicates Various Rights Under the First
Amendment, the Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny ....................... 147
B. The Court Could Alternatively Apply the Undue Burden Standard
.......................................................................................................... 147
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Requirement ......................................................................................... 147
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 153

INTRODUCTION
Marriage continues to be a cornerstone of our social order. Its value
is illustrated not just by the recent fight for marriage equality for
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homosexual citizens8 but in the myriad of ways that marriage stabilizes
society.9 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence around this historic union
highlights that marriage is a fundamental right guaranteed by our
Constitution. But the Court also recognizes that divorce laws are subject
to judicial scrutiny; the power of the State to regulate the termination of a
marriage is not absolute.10
North Carolina’s no-fault divorce scheme previously required
parties seeking a divorce to either live separate and apart for two years11
or pursue a divorce through one of the at-fault options.12 In 1966, the
legislature reduced the required time period to one year.13 That same
year, the State provided that an at-fault ruling amounts to “nothing more
than a judicial separation.”14 In effect, this required that every party
seeking divorce comply with the year-long separation period before
being awarded an absolute divorce. North Carolina, as a matter of policy,
views marriage as a fundamental keystone of civilization.15 This is not an
unfounded policy as marriage helps promote better childhood outcomes,
economic stability, and social stability.16 The State certainly has a
compelling interest in regulating marital relationships, both at their
inception and dissolution.
The year-long separation period, however, is a blanket policy that
applies to every couple no matter the reason the party is seeking a
divorce.17 This policy and accompanying regulatory scheme raise several
questions. Is any marriage better than no marriage? Is the State’s
compelling interest and current regulation sufficient to outweigh the
individual liberties protected by the Constitution as it relates to decisionmaking in familial relationships? If the State cannot regulate a couple’s
decision-making within the marital union, then to what extent can the
State regulate decision-making on whether to remain within a marital
8

See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 645 (where the Supreme Court recognized
marriage equality under the Fourteenth Amendment).
9
See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at. 657
10
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
11
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
12
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1950).
13
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1966).
14
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1966).
15
McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 126 (1953) (Barnhill, J., concurring).
16
Ron Haskins, Marriage, Parenthood, and Public Policy, 21 NAT’L AFFAIRS
55, 55, 65 (2014).
17
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (2021).
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union at all? Does a year-long separation period actually promote
reconciliation, or are there less intrusive ways for the State to discourage
divorce for those couples who might be able to reconcile?
The Supreme Court has addressed constitutional issues related to
divorce before, but on the merits has never squarely considered how
divorce (or marriage) might be protected by the First Amendment alone
(instead addressing divorce law under the Fourteenth Amendment).18
This comment presents the argument that North Carolina’s current nofault requirements to obtain a divorce violates an individual’s First
Amendment rights in three ways: (1) freedom of expressive association,
(2) freedom of intimate association, and (3) freedom from compelled
speech. The first section is an overview of North Carolina’s divorce law
and the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence on marriage and divorce.
The following three sections analogize Supreme Court jurisprudence on
each freedom to the issue of divorce. These sections will show that
divorce is not just the inverse of the fundamental right to marriage (under
a substantive due process argument), but it is also its own separate right
protected by the First Amendment. The fifth section addresses the
appropriate burden to apply to state divorce law and why North
Carolina’s laws fail to meet that burden. Finally, the sixth section
proposes different regulatory schemes that will better protect an
individual’s First Amendment rights better achieve the State’s policy of
protecting the sanctity of marriage.
NORTH CAROLINA DIVORCE LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
The starting point for this discussion is the current state of the law.
This section highlights North Carolina’s current scheme of divorce law,
the State’s justification for requiring a year-long separation period, and

18

The cases generally approach the topics of marriage and divorce from a
Fourteenth Amendment perspective, either under equal protection, due process,
or substantive due process. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2
(1967) (holding Virginia’s miscegenation statute unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 (holding a Connecticut law
unconstitutional per the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the law denied access to the courts based on an inability to pay fees);
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375–77 (holding a Wisconsin statute that required
individuals seeking marriage to show they are current on child support payments
and the child is not likely to become a public charge before being granted
permission to marry unconstitutional under the equal protection clause).
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on divorce (and the marital
relationship, more generally).
A. North Carolina’s Current Statutory Scheme of Divorce Laws
It is important to start by recognizing that North Carolina’s divorce
laws are neither the most restrictive in the country, nor the least. Prior to
adopting a no-fault divorce scheme, North Carolina required a party to
prove one of six fault-based grounds: (1) abandonment, (2) maliciously
turning the other out, (3) cruel or barbarous treatment, (4) intolerable life
conditions, (5) excessive alcohol or drug use, or (6) adultery.19 North
Carolina later adopted a no-fault only scheme for obtaining an absolute
divorce.20 This scheme allows parties to obtain a judgement of absolute
divorce from state courts by meeting two requirements: (1) six-month
residency and (2) a continuous, year-long separation.21 This comment
will focus solely on the separation period and will assume residency is
not at issue.
Fault-based divorce laws still exist in North Carolina,22 but even
after a party proves one of the fault-based conditions, the State still
requires a one-year separation period before it will grant an absolute
divorce.23 A judgment under the fault-based statute is merely a judicial
separation; it is not an absolute divorce.24 Moreover, the separation
period is just the first hurdle. A party may not even file for divorce until
they can show the separation period requirement is met.25 From there, a
contested divorce can prolong the proceedings.

19

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (2019).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1966) (providing that “a divorce from bed and board
is nothing more than a judicial separation).
21
§ 50-6.
22
§ 50-7 (2019).
23
Id.; Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 790 (1961) (“A divorce from bed and
board is nothing more than a judicial separation; that is, an authorized separation
of the husband and wife. Such divorce merely suspends the effect of the
marriage as to cohabitation, but does not dissolve the marriage bond.”).
24
Schlagel, 253 N.C. at 790. Parties can also obtain an absolute divorce by
showing incurable insanity; but this requires a three-year separation period. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-5.1 (2019). Because this timeframe is longer than that of the
one-year separation requirement, this comment will focus on the more widely
applicable and shorter separation period.
25
§ 50-6 (2019).
20
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B. The Separation Justification
As a general matter, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s right to
regulate marriage and divorce.26 The Court announced that states have a
compelling interest in maintaining the sanctity of these relationships
because of the societal values associated with marriage.27
North Carolina, specifically, has a strong policy of favoring
marriage over non-marriage.28 This is evidenced not just by the scheme
of divorce laws adopted, but by the State’s continued adherence to heart
balm torts which provide a civil cause of action against those who
negatively affect marital relations.29
The State’s policy preference can be justified by the various
positive outcomes related to marriage. The most impactful positive
outcome relates to childhood development. Children raised in a twoparent household where the parents are married outperform their peers
raised in non-marriage households in nearly every performance metric
available.30 Marriage also promotes social and economic stability in
communities.31 But these statistics have some limitations. The question
of whether these outcomes are true, no matter the stability of the
marriage, is difficult to answer.32

26

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The power of the States
over marriage and divorce is, of course, complete except as limited by specific
constitutional provisions.”); Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404 (“The durational residency
requirement under attack in this case is a part of Iowa’s comprehensive statutory
regulation of domestic relations, an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States.”).
27
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496–98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
28
Jessica T. Burgess, Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements
in North Carolina, 35 CAMPBELL L. REV. 227, 235 (2013) (compiling cases in
which courts upheld marriages as valid despite failure to comply with statutory
requirements).
29
Malecek v. Williams, 804 S.E.2d 592, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
30
W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, 1 NAT’L AFFAIRS 81, 84
(2009).
31
HASKINS, supra note 17, at 55.
32
Meaning, are children raised in a home with married parents that abuse one
another still going to experience better outcomes than if they are raised in a
household with divorced parents?
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C. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Marriage and Divorce
The Supreme Court has addressed marriage on several occasions—
most recently in Obergefell v. Hodges.33 Relying on precedent laid out in
Loving v. Virginia, the Court extended the fundamental right to marry to
same sex couples.34 Both landmark cases addressed marriage under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court resolved these issues as
products of equal protection arguments.35
The Court also considered the issue of divorce before, but again in
light of challenges to State regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a state law that denied
access to the courts to seek a divorce because the parties could not afford
to pay the applicable court fees.36 The Court found the State’s bar to
access for inability to pay court fees violated the Fourteenth Amendment
for two reasons.37 First, the Due Process Clause requires that individuals
have an opportunity to be heard, and the financial bar to access amounted
to the State denying the parties’ constitutionally protected opportunity.38
Second, the State applied the regulation in an unconstitutional manner
because although court fees are valid, they cannot act as an absolute bar
to court access.39
Recent scholarship on the constitutional questions about divorce
tends to make the argument that divorce, like marriage, is a substantive
due process right.40 This analysis brings about the same conclusion
presented in this comment: state regulation of divorce is subject to more
rigorous constitutional scrutiny than rational basis review.
Although a substantive due process analysis is fitting for the issue
of divorce, the Court also has a line of jurisprudence related to First
Amendment issues of freedom of expressive association, freedom of
intimate association, and freedom from compelled speech. Rather than
substantive due process, these cases raise a different question: to what
extent do marriage and divorce implicate these associational freedoms
recognized by the court; and, how might a state-imposed continuation of
33

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 655.
Id. at 728.
35
Id. at 655; Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
36
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 378–79.
39
Id. at 380.
40
See HOROWITZ, supra note 8, at 883; see also Brian L. Frye & Maybell
Romero, The Right to Unmarry: A Proposal, 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 89, 90
(2020).
34
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this legal relationship amount to compelled speech? This comment
addresses those questions and answers in the affirmative: divorce falls
within the spectrum of protected associations and speech, such that,
North Carolina’s regulation of it must comport with the appropriate
constitutional standard of review.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The First Amendment protects more than an individual’s right to
speak freely.41 It also protects an individual’s freedom to associate with
others.42 This associational right is derived from the right to free
speech.43 There are some associations the Supreme Court has recognized
that enjoy constitutional protections because they are integral to an
individual’s ability to exercise their First Amendment rights fully.44
This section explores what expressive association is, how the
Court analyzes expressive associations cases, how divorce falls within
this jurisprudential framework, how North Carolina divorce law violates
this right, and potential limitations to expressive associations.
A. Freedom of Expressive Association Defined
The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate
in order to engage in expression—the freedom of expressive
association.45 It is the “right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.”46 This right, of course, is not without its limitations. The group
must engage in “some form of expression, whether it be public or
private,”47 but the group need not associate solely for the purpose of
“disseminating a certain message” to enjoy First Amendment
protections.48
41

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 462 (1958).
42
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
43
Id.
44
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460 (“Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” (citations omitted)).
45
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
46
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
47
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
48
Id. at 655.
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There is a spectrum of associational relations.49 Some associations
are impersonal and transactional; others are intimate and private. This
spectrum requires “careful assessment” of any given association in order
to determine how much protection it might be afforded.50 The Court
views private associations as the most protected, while transactional
associations are the least protected.51 The kinds of associations that are
not protected under the umbrella of expressive associations are generally
recreational in nature, with a loose connection built merely by proximity
in time, place, or activity.52 The kinds of expressive associations that are
protected under the umbrella of expressive associations include civic
organizations, clubs for childhood development, and parades.53 The
Fourth Circuit even recognized an expressive association among
members of a university fraternity.54
Most important to the analysis of this right, in the context of
divorce, is that the freedom to associate “plainly presupposes a freedom
to not associate.”55 The Court upheld the right to exclude members from
expressive associations in Dale.56 Because the marital relationship falls
within the confines of protected expressive associations, it may be
inferred this freedom to not associate includes the freedom to not
associate with a spouse.
B. Freedom of Expressive Association Applied
The Court’s jurisprudence on expressive association—specifically
the right to exclude certain people from an expressive association—is
best exemplified in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale57 and Roberts v.

49

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
Id. (“Determining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to
enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful
assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments.”).
51
Id. (“Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the
State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse that would not apply to
regulations affecting the choice of one’s fellow employees.”).
52
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25(1989).
53
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
54
Iota Xi Chapter Of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 146–47
(4th Cir. 2009).
55
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
56
Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
57
Id. at 644.
50

122

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:112

United State Jaycees.58 In both cases, the Court considered the issue of
whether an organization could exclude certain classes of people in light
of state anti-discrimination statutes.59 While the outcomes in both cases
were different, the Court applied the same framework. First, is the
organization an expressive association such that it is protected by the
First Amendment?60 Second, by forcing the association to accept
members the group would otherwise exclude, did the State law
“impermissibly burden” or “significantly affect” the group’s
expression?61
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court upheld the
exclusionary right of the Boy Scouts of America.62 At issue in Dale was
New Jersey’s public accommodations law which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.63 Dale, an Eagle Scout
and Assistant Scoutmaster, publicly declared himself as homosexual and
became a gay rights activist in the 1990s.64 As a result of his sexual
orientation, the Boy Scouts revoked his membership and title because the
organization did not condone homosexuality.65 After filing suit against
the Boy Scouts under the State’s public accommodations law, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts must comply with the
law, forbidding the group from excluding Dale because of his sexual
orientation.66 In short, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
organization did not fall within the ambit of protection as an expressive
association and therefore did not enjoy exclusionary rights.67
The Supreme Court’s analysis started with the recognition that
“[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the
group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints.”68 But, to enjoy this protection, the organization must

58

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612; Dale, 530 U.S. at 643.
60
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621; Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
61
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621–22; Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
62
Dale, 530 U.S. at 642.
63
Id. at 645.
64
Id. at 644–45.
65
Id. at 645.
66
Id. at 646.
67
Id.
68
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487
U.S. 1, 13 (1988)) (emphasis added).
59
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be sufficiently “expressive.”69 The Court did not define exactly what a
group must do in order to be sufficiently expressive, but it did highlight
that the group need not be associated for the purpose of advocating a
particular viewpoint or agenda.70 Instead, the “group must engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”71
The Court determined the Boy Scouts fell within this definition
based on the following:
It is a private, nonprofit organization;
It has a mission statement and oath;
Adult leaders spend time with youth members in order to instill
the mentioned values;
Adult leaders instruct youth members on various outdoor
activities;
Adult leaders inculcate Boy Scouts with the group’s values
(“expressly and by example”).72

The Court provided no analysis on how exactly these facts
amounted to expression. The majority opinion instead simply stated,
“[t]he Boy Scouts engage[] in expressive activity . . . .”73
The Court then considered whether the “forced inclusion” of Dale
would “significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints.”74 This required the Court to consider what the Boy
Scouts believed about homosexuality. In addition to a handful of internal
communications between executive members, the Scout oath and law
commanded young boys to remain “morally straight” and “clean.”75 The
Court adopted the representations proffered by the Boy Scouts that these
words meant young men were not meant to engage in homosexual
activity. The Court stated it had no role in evaluating the consistency—or
inconsistency—with these words and the group’s internal operations.76
The Court considered exactly what kind of burden Dale’s inclusion
would place on the Boy Scouts, determining that at a minimum his

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id. (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 649–50.
73
Id. at 650.
74
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
75
Id. at 649.
76
Id. at 651.
70
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presence would require the organization to send an implicit message
condoning homosexual conduct.77 It did not matter to the Court that the
Boy Scouts were not associating to petition against homosexuality
overtly.78 Instead, the Court applied a rather deferential standard: “An
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”79 The Court rejected the
argument that because heterosexual members could be gay allies the
Scout message was inconsistent.80 According to the Court, expressive
associations must not consist of individuals with homogenous views
about every issue.81 But in Dale’s case, the public nature of his sexuality
coupled with the Boy Scout’s official policy were too incongruous to
mandate inclusion, even under a state public accommodation law.82 The
Court determined there was a distinct difference between a heterosexual
person who supported gay rights wearing a Scout uniform and a
homosexual person wearing a Scout uniform: the latter sent a “distinctly
different message.”83
Dale highlights two key points. First, expressive association rights
are not limited to certain types of groups pursuing more traditional forms
of free speech.84 While expressive association protections might be
heightened for religious or political associations, the Court here extended
the protection to a non-political, non-religious organization.85 The Court
provided clear guidance. First, there must simply be some form of
expression from the association in order to enjoy the right of exclusion.86
Second, the Court is deferential to an association’s representations on

77

Id. at 654 (Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force
the organization to send a message, both to youth members and the world, that
Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.).
78
Id. at 655.
79
Id. (emphasis added).
80
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 655–56.
83
Id. (“The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an
assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing
with Boy Scouts policy.”).
84
Id. at 655 (“First, associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment.”).
85
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
86
Id.at 648.
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what exactly their expression is.87 Although Dale made strong, logical
arguments about the contrary nature of the Boy Scout’s official position
on homosexuality, the Court refused to look behind the curtain and
instead adopted the association’s official position on its face.88 In the
context of divorce, this is important because Dale left the door open to
include the marital relationship within the umbrella of expressive
association and upheld a right of exclusion.
Conversely, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court denied
exclusionary rights protection to the Jaycees.89 The Minnesota chapters
of the United States Jaycees admitted women as regular members for
approximately ten years before the national organization threatened to
revoke their charters.90 Minnesota courts determined that the exclusion of
women violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which forbade
discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation on the basis
of sex.91 Eventually, the national organization sued Minnesota claiming
the anti-discrimination statute violated the organization’s “constitutional
rights of free speech and association” because requiring women be
admitted to a traditionally all-male organization would substantially and
directly interfere with their policies.92 The Court of Appeals determined
that Minnesota’s statute violated the Jaycee’s right to “select its members
[as] protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”93
The Supreme Court’s analysis began by affirming that the freedom
of association is protected “as a fundamental element of personal
liberty.”94 The protection of associational freedoms is a derivate right,
necessary to ensuring those rights central to the First Amendment—
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Id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of
what would impair its expression.”).
88
Id. at 651 (“[I]t is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed
values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent.”).
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Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
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Id. at 614.
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Id. at 614–17.
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Id. at 615.
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Id. at 616–17 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th
Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added).
94
Id. at 618.
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"speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion”—are protected from government infringement.95
The Court then considered whether the Jaycees, as an organization,
was protected by the guarantee of expressive association rights.96 The
Court determined this case implicated expressive association rights
because “of the various protected activities in which the Jaycees
engage[d]. . . .”97 While the majority did not provide analysis on what
exactly made the Jaycees organization subject to expressive association
protections, the Court did discuss the following:
The Jaycees is a non-profit organization;98
The group pursued “educational and charitable purposes” as a
civic organization;99
There were bylaws establishing membership requirements
(allowing only men to become full members);100
Members had to pay dues and fees;101
The national offices made available “to members . . . travel
accessories, casual wear, pins, awards, and other gifts.”102

The Court then analyzed to what extent the Minnesota antidiscrimination statute infringed on the Jaycee’s expressive association
rights. The Court acknowledged that there are many ways in which a
state may infringe on these rights, such as imposing penalties,
withholding government benefits, requiring disclosure of membership, or
interfering with the internal organization of the group.103 However, the
Court categorized forced inclusion as the clearest example of intrusion
into an association’s internal structure, stating plainly: “Freedom of
95

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 622 (“The Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual
liberties.”) (“We have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment, a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”).
96
Id. at 622.
97
Id.
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Id. at 612.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 613.
101
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
102
Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 622–23.
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association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”104
Recognizing that there are limitations to these freedoms, the Court also
provided potential justifications for when a state might legitimately
involve itself in an association’s activities: government intrusion “may
be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”105
Ultimately, the Court was not convinced that forced inclusion of
women in the Jaycees impermissibly burdened the group’s expressive
rights.106 In part, because the Jaycees failed to show that the mere
presence of women as full voting members would “impede[] the
organization’s ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to
disseminate its preferred views.”107 Inclusion of women, in short, would
not affect the civic pursuits of the organization.108 Moreover, the
organization had a long history of allowing women to participate in all of
its activities, just without the membership designation.109
A third case, Dallas v. Stanglin, provides a limit, so to speak, on
how far the Court is willing to extend expressive associational
protections. In Dallas, the Court did not extend expressive associational
protections to patrons of a dance hall.110 The dance hall owner challenged
a Dallas city ordinance that restricted access to certain dance halls based
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Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
Id.
106
Id. at 627.
107
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
108
Id. (“The [anti-discrimination statute] requires no change in the Jaycees’
creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no restrictions on
the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies
different from those of existing members.”).
109
Id. (“Moreover, the Jaycees already invites women to share the group’s views
and philosophy and to participate in much of its training and community
activities. Accordingly, any claim that admission of women as full voting
members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women
are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best.”).
110
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (“These opportunities might be
described as ‘associational’ in common parlance, but they simply do not involve
the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to
protect. The hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at this particular
dance hall are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the
same business establishment. Most are strangers to one another, and the dance
hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fee.”).
105
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on age and time of day.111 The owner claimed the ordinance violated
(among other things) the First Amendment rights of minors to
associate.112 The Texas Court of Appeals determined the ordinance
violated a minor’s First Amendment associational rights (as to the age
restriction) based on a “fundamental right of ‘social association.’”113 The
court argued that rational basis scrutiny was inappropriate, and the
ordinance failed to satisfy the higher burden of strict scrutiny.114
The Supreme Court began by identifying the right at issue; it
disagreed with the Texas Court of Appeals in finding an associational
right implicated. Citing to Roberts, the Court found that the minors who
frequented the dance hall were not in any kind of associational
relationship—expressive or otherwise.115 Integral to this finding was the
sheer number of teenagers involved on any given night, the fact that
many of them were strangers to one another, and the strongest
connection among them was that they were patrons of the same
business.116 Moreover, the dance hall had only two requirements: (1) fall
within the ordinance’s age requirements and (2) pay the admission fee.117
After finding error in the analysis of the First Amendment right of
association in relation to these facts, the Court went on to evaluate the
appropriate standard of scrutiny.118 Because there was no First
Amendment right at issue, the Court determined rational basis scrutiny
was appropriate (as an age-based category under the Equal Protection
clause) and upheld the ordinance.119
Combining these three precedential cases, it is clear the first
question is whether the association is sufficiently expressive in order to
enjoy First Amendment protections. If the association is expressive, the
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Id.at 22.
Id.
113
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 22–23.
115
Id. at 24.
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Dallas, 490 U.S. at 24–25 (“These opportunities might be described as
‘associational’ in common parlance, but they simply do not involve the sort of
expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to protect. The
hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are
not members of an organized association; they are patrons of the same business
establishment. Most are strangers to one another, and the dance hall admits all
who are willing to pay the admission fee.”).
117
Id. at 24–25.
118
Id. at 25.
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Id. at 25–26, 28.
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next question is whether the forced inclusion of certain members would
impermissibly affect the expression. Although Roberts yielded a
different result than Dale, the key difference is in the question of how
forced inclusion would affect the association’s expression. The Court
based their rejection of the Jaycees’ argument that forced inclusion of
women would affect the association’s expression on the fact that the
Jaycees knowingly allowed women to participate in all of their functions,
just without official membership.120 The Boy Scouts, however, had
(ostensibly) not let openly homosexual people join their organization.121
In the context of divorce, this analysis is crucial. If the marital
relationship falls within the ambit of protection for expressive
association, then how does the forced inclusion of parties to that
association affect their desired message? The next section addresses both
issues and presents the argument that the marital relationship falls within
the Court’s parameters of an expressive association, and like Dale,
forced inclusion would violate the associational rights protected by the
First Amendment.
C. Freedom of Expressive Association and Divorce
Of course, the first question is whether the divorce is sufficiently
expressive to bring it within the umbrella of First Amendment
protections. The analysis must recognize that divorce is predicated upon
the existence of a marital relationship. If the act of getting married, or the
marital relationship, are at all expressive, then their inverse—getting a
divorce and being divorced—are as well.
First, marriage is a form of expressive association because it
encompasses many of the types of activities and aims the Supreme Court,
Fourth Circuit, and North Carolina courts have considered sufficiently
expressive in the past.
In Dale, the Court noted that the Boy Scouts are a private
organization that established their own rules, oaths, and membership
requirements.122 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit made note of the same
characteristic when evaluating the expressive rights of a college
fraternity.123 Conversely, the Court ruled that mere attendance at a public
dance hall did not create expressive associational rights between
120

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 675.
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Id. at 649–50.
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Iota Xi Chapter Of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 146–47
(2009).
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patrons.124 Marital relationships are perhaps the most private human
relationship of all. The Court’s consideration of private versus public
organization weighs in favor of finding expressive associational rights
for the marital union.
The Court in Dale also considered the Boy Scout oath in its
evaluation of the group’s right to expressive association.125 While the
Court did not explain exactly how the oath weighed in favor of declaring
the Boy Scouts an expressive association, several inferences can be
drawn. First, an oath is an actual expression in and of itself. Individuals
within the association tend to take the same oath adopted by the
association. Second, these oaths serve as the standards for conduct while
participating as a member. Likewise, married couples make vows to one
another during a marriage ceremony. These vows also tend to serve as a
framework for what each partner promises to the other during the
marriage: loyalty, support, fidelity, or encouragement. The presence of
an oath—one that unites the individual members to the identity of the
association—is powerful evidence that the association is expressive. It
signals that the individual members of the body ascribe to the vision of
the whole. Marital vows signal the same adoption of a unified body
between the members.
Outward expression of membership was also part of the Court’s
analysis in Roberts and Dale.126 In Roberts, the Court identified that
members of the Jaycees wore lapel pins and other accouterment that
were only available to full-fledged members.127 In Dale, the Court placed
significant weight on the idea that the mere presence of Dale wearing a
Boy Scout uniform would affect the group’s expression.128 These points
highlight that the outward representation of membership in an
association helps further the expression of the association. For example,
boys wear Boy Scout uniforms but girls do not.129 This helps further the
124

Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24–25.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
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Dale, 530 U.S. at 656; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
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Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
128
Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
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See generally, SCOUTS Youth 11-17 years old: Ready to Join?, BOY SCOUTS
OF AM., https://www.scouting.org/scoutsbsa/ (last visited Apr., 9, 2022) (At
least at the time Dale was decided this was true; since that Court opinion, the
Boy Scouts of America have allowed female Scouts to join. The website
provides that “[f]or the first time in its 100+ year history, the iconic program of
the Boy Scouts of American is open to young women as well as young men, all
of whom will have the change to earn Scouting’s highest rank, Eagle Scout.”
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association’s expression that it existed to develop boys, not girls. In most
cultures, people outwardly represent their marital status by wearing (or
not wearing) marital accessories. In in the United States, the tradition
takes the form of wearing a wedding band on the left-hand ring finger.
This outward representation expresses, without the need for any spoken
words, the following: I am married and am not romantically available.
There are other expressions somewhat unique to the marital
relationship. The first is that culturally, the married couple may start
collectively representing themselves in public as “The Smith’s” or “The
Wellington Family.” In heterosexual couples, it is still culturally
common for wives to adopt their husband’s last name. This is also true
for women who use the title “Missus” instead of “Miss.” Each of these
changes colloquially or officially signal that not only does the marital
relationship exist, but that the person is a member of it. This signal
carries certain societal expectations, private expectations, and legal
benefits and obligations.
Interestingly, the courts above did not explicitly consider the
pursuits of the various associations. The Court in Dale even explicitly
denied that a group must be of a particular pursuit to enjoy expressive
association protections.130 Regardless, in analyzing whether a group is
sufficiently expressive to bring it within these protections, the group’s
end goal is seemingly less relevant than the aforementioned
considerations.
These considerations (privacy, vows / oaths, and outward
expression of membership) that brought the Boy Scouts and the Jaycee’s
within the protections of expressive association are equally applicable to
the marital relationship. The expression is this: I am part of a marital
union and am no longer romantically available. I uphold the marital
vows I took to my spouse.
Divorce is the inverse of this expressive association. In seeking a
divorce, a party expresses their desire to no longer be bound by the vows
once expressed. They stop wearing marital accouterment, change names,
and send a different message: I am no longer part of a union and may be
romantically available. A divorce is more than a resumption of being
single, and it requires more than simply removing oneself from a
committed partner. It requires the dissolution of a legally binding
relationship. The sheer number of substantial changes that take effect
But prior to this change, because girls could not become members of the Boy
Scouts, they could not wear Scout uniforms. Now they can.).
130
Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
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upon a divorce (in terms of default legal rules and societal expectations)
make it more than a simple break-up. It is the dismantling of a union.
D. North Carolina’s Divorce Law Infringes on the Freedom of
Expressive Association Because it Impermissibly Forces Inclusion
E. What are the Potential Limits to Expressive Association Rights?
FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
In addition to protecting the freedom of expressive association, the
First Amendment also protects an individual’s freedom of intimate
association.139 This section explores what intimate association is, how the
Court has approached intimate association issues, how divorce falls
within this jurisprudential framework, and how North Carolina’s laws
violate this right.
A. Freedom of Intimate Association Defined
The source of the right to intimate association is not perfectly clear,
but scholars argue it stems from the Court’s jurisprudence in Griswold v.
Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas.140 More importantly, the Court has
since expressly provided that the right of association takes two forms:
expressive and intimate.141
In Griswold, the Court created a “penumbra” of privacy rights that
gave legal scholars ample fodder to craft decades worth of law review
articles.142 On the narrow issue of intimate association as a protection
provided by the First Amendment though, the Court provided some
clearer guidance. The Court first acknowledged that associational
freedoms are rights peripheral to the First Amendment.143 This means
that while the First Amendment may not explicitly use the word
“associate,” an association between individuals is often necessary to
ensure citizens enjoy the full exercise of their First Amendment rights.
139

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.
See Kenneth L. Karst, THE FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION, 89
YALE L. J. 624, 624-25 (1980); See also Nancy Catherine Marcus, THE
FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 269, 270 (2006).
141
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18; See also Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426
F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (citing NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462).
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For example, individuals who want to assemble or petition the
government must be able to communicate among one another in order to
assemble and organize a petition. At times, intimate associations are also
necessary to allow citizens to enjoy the full exercise of their First
Amendment rights in areas like religion.144
But as for the marital relationship, the Court has been quick to
acknowledge it falls in a category of its own because of its history,
tradition, and importance to society at large.145 The language of the Court
in Griswold is almost poetic: “We deal with a right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is . . . intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes.”146
The source of intimate association rights under the First
Amendment in Lawrence is more difficult to draw because the Court
considered Texas’s anti-sodomy law in light of a challenge to the
Fourteenth Amendment.147 In fact, the opinion never mentions the First
Amendment by name. However, the Court rightly discusses the sexual
relationship at issue as one of “intimate conduct.”148 Even though the
merits of the case did not address First Amendment challenges to
intimate association, the Court recognized where consensual sexual
conduct is at stake, the issue is clearly one of intimacy.149 This is
especially important because the parties in Lawrence were not married.150
They simply engaged in consensual, sexual conduct.151 Marriage is an
association that encompasses more than just sexual conduct. If sex alone
is sufficient to bring a relationship within the ambit of intimate
association protections, then marriage exceeds that threshold.
The Court in Roberts expressly recognized the existence of the right
to intimate association for the first time.152 In doing so, it provided
144

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 656 (“From their beginning to their most recent page,
the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage.”);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 564.
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Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.
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attributes lower courts should consider when determining whether an
association is sufficiently intimate to secure it “against undue intrusion
by the State.”153 The attributes of an intimate association are: “relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain
the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship.”154 Justice Brennan all but conclusively placed familial
relationships and marriage within the realm of intimate association.155
“The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that
might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that
attend the creation and sustenance of a family—marriage.”156 Although
the Court did not consider intimate association in Roberts, the framework
above is still instructive.
More recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a
challenge to the State’s adherence to heart balm torts as a violation of
First Amendment intimate associational rights. Although the court did
not provide a clear definition of intimate association, it did find that
“facing liability for engaging in intimate sexual relations . . . can
implicate the First . . . Amendment right[] to . . . expression.”157
To be sure, the Court’s jurisprudence on intimate associational
rights is not abundantly clear. There is no definition or elemental test to
apply to determine whether an association is intimate such that it enjoys
constitutional protections. It is sufficient to say, for the purposes of this
comment, that marriage does fall within whatever definition the Court
may apply because of Griswold, Lawrence, and Roberts. The next
section considers how the Court approached issues of intimate
association in the past.
B. Freedom of Intimate Association Applied
There are few cases that interpret the right of intimate association,
and even fewer that do so under a challenge to the First Amendment.
However, an overview of the cases provides a similar framework: where
there is an intimate association, it is afforded constitutional protections.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court considered legislation passed
in Connecticut that made it illegal for citizens to use contraceptives and
153
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for individuals to aid in the use of contraceptives.158 Defendants in the
case were medical professionals who provided contraceptive care to
married couples.159 They appealed their convictions, arguing the law
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.160 The Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors affirmed the judgments below, upholding the defendants’
convictions.161
Admittedly, the problem with this case as an illustration for
intimate association rights under the First Amendment is that the
Supreme Court did not clearly define which constitutional amendment
provided the firm basis for its decision. It rejected a Lochner-type
Fourteenth Amendment argument,162 instead adopting a “penumbra”
approach related to “zone[s] of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”163 The Court then determined the law swept
“unnecessarily broadly”164 considering the State’s claim that the law was
meant to curtail extramarital affairs.165
At the state level, in Malececk v. Williams the North Carolina Court
of Appeals considered constitutional challenges to the heart balm torts.166
Malececk involved a husband who sued his wife’s lover under North
Carolina tort law “for alienation of affection and criminal
conversation.”167 The defendant-lover argued that the torts were facially
unconstitutional because they violated his First Amendment “rights to
engage in intimate sexual activity, speech, and expression with other
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 481–82.
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Id. at 485.
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“Such a law cannot stand in light of the
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to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
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invade the area of protected freedoms.’ Would we allow the police to search the
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Id. at 498.
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consenting adults.”168 The trial court heard the defendant’s argument at
the motion to dismiss stage and granted the defendant’s motion.169
On appeal, the State appellate court agreed that liability for intimate
sexual relations can implicate the First Amendment.170 However, the
court found the defendant’s argument regarding his association claim
unpersuasive.171 Instead, the court determined there were “countless
ways” for two consenting adults to associate without incurring liability
under the heart balm torts.172 Ultimately, the court viewed these torts as
acceptable, conduct-related regulations because their aim is to provide a
remedy for a wronged spouse, not restrict free expression.173
C. Freedom of Intimate Association and Divorce in North Carolina
Justice Brennan argued in Roberts that familial relationships are
inherently intimate associations: “Family relationships by their nature
involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects
of one’s life.”174 Marriage is at the heart of the intimacy and privacy
issues the Court considered in Griswold.175 There, the Court placed
marriage at the furthest end of the spectrum—it is the most protected
kind of association.176 This is mainly because, in many cases, marriage
brings with it the expectation that the spouses will forgo sexual relations
with other parties (“open marriages” notwithstanding).177
168
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The problem with North Carolina divorce law in this aspect is that
divorce fundamentally changes the nature of the intimate relationship in
a way that mere separation does not. When parties divorce, they are free
to enter into new intimate relationships (sexual or otherwise) that are not
regulated by the State (i.e. North Carolina’s criminal statute for adultery
and heart balm tort causes of action), nor regulated by private
expectations. The decisional aspects of intimate associations as outlined
in Griswold create a conundrum: a state cannot regulate the decisions
made within the relationship, but it can regulate the decision on whether
to remain in the relationship at all.
There is also a significant difference regarding the State’s deference
towards heart balm torts. The heart balm tort cases usually involve a
third party defending against a married party’s claim by asserting the tort
interferes with their First Amendment right to an adulterous affair. This
is a significant difference because a party filing for divorce is a party to
the marriage, not an outsider. Moreover, the defendant in a heart balm
tort is not engaged in a legally binding relationship. Their ability to
express the creation of the relationship or termination thereof is not
dependent on state interference—a marital relationship is. While the
rights asserted may sound the same (the right to intimate association),
they are different in creation. In the context of marriage, the State is
effectively preventing the creation of a new intimate association or
termination of the marital intimate association. But the State is not
preventing intimate association creation or termination in the context of a
heart balm tort. Instead, the State is enforcing the rights of a married
partner who asserts a civil law claim.
Although the freedom of intimate association is not clearly defined
in a broad sense, the Court’s language in Roberts and Griswold is
essentially conclusive: marriage is an intimate association.178 This
freedom protects individuals from state intrusion into the decisionmaking aspects of the relationship (whether to use birth control or
whether to engage in sodomy). North Carolina divorce law violates this
right because it prevents individuals from exercising their decisional
rights to dissolve their marriage. The next section considers how the oneyear separation period amounts to compelled speech.

persons. It is not likely at this current juncture the Court would consider
Constitutional protections for three (or more) person marriages because that
fundamentally alters the “intimacy” of the relationship considered in the above
cases.
178
Id.; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
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FREEDOM FROM COMPELLED SPEECH
In addition to protecting associational freedoms, the First
Amendment also protects an individual from a state’s attempt to compel
speech.179 Much like the freedom of association includes a freedom to
exclude, the freedom to speak includes the freedom to not speak at all.180
This section explores what compelled speech is, how the Court has
approached compelled speech contexts similar to divorce, how divorce
falls within this jurisprudential framework, and how North Carolina’s
one-year separation period requirement amounts to compelled speech.
A. Freedom from Compelled Speech Defined
The First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech includes
within its gilded armor the freedom from compelled speech.181 These
protections mean more than simply the right to open one’s mouth and
speak or not; they intend to protect the speaker’s right to craft his or her
own message.182 This includes the choice to speak on particular issues or
not speak on those issues.183
In the context of divorce, this begs the question of whether the
State’s one-year separation period forces individuals to speak on a matter
they would rather not, or whether it denies individuals the right to craft
their own message. Considering the Court’s jurisprudence on what state
179
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of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message. . . . Indeed this general rule, that the
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of
value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker
would rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation.”
(citations omitted)).
183
Id. at 574–75 (“[T]he Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not
like from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its
right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject
while remaining silent on another. . . . But whatever the reason, it boils down to
the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that
choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”).
180
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action amounts to a compulsion to speak, the one-year separation period
likely violates this right.
B. Freedom from Compelled Speech Applied
There are many cases that discuss the freedom from compelled
speech. Those cases discussed below most closely fit with the analysis of
divorce as a First Amendment issue because they represent situations in
which the state forced parties to speak on matters antithetical to their
core beliefs.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
considered one such case.184 The West Virginia State Board of Education
made it mandatory that students participate in saluting the American flag
each morning and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.185 A student’s
refusal to do so subjected them to disciplinary action, to include
expulsion.186 Parents of children in the school system objected to the
requirement; the salute and pledge violated tenants of their faith as
Jehovah’s Witnesses.187 Their children were subsequently expelled and
officials threatened to send them to reform schools for juvenile
offenders.188 The lower court restrained enforcement of the school
board’s requirement on children of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, which
the State appealed.189
The Supreme Court defined the conflict in this case as “a
compulsion of students to declare a belief.”190 Inherent to the analysis is
recognition of what exactly made this regulation fall within the ambit of
“speech.” The Court noted that the symbolism of the flag, saluting, and
spoken pledges all constituted speech protected by the First
Amendment.191 The compulsory activity would allow state authorities to
184

W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
Id. at 625.
186
Id. at 629.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 630.
189
Id.
190
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631.
191
Id. at 632–33 (“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas. . . . Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of
acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee. A person
gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort
and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn. . . . It is also to be noted that the
compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude
of mind.”).
185
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“compel [a person] to utter what is not in his mind.”192 Before inquiring
about the appropriateness of an exception, the Court first considered
whether the State even had the power to compel this kind of patriotic, but
religiously offensive, speech from students of the Jehovah’s Witness
faith.193 The Court held the State did not have such power.194 The Court’s
opinion ends there; because the State did not have the power to compel
this kind of speech, there was no need for further analysis. The Court
overturned a previously decided case that ruled to the contrary.195
In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court considered a First Amendment
challenge to New Hampshire’s license plate laws.196 The State’s
passenger vehicle license plates included the motto “Live Free or Die.”197
The State also punished citizens who knowingly obscured “figures or
letters on any number plate,” which the State Supreme Court interpreted
to include the motto.198 The State issued three citations to Mr. Maynard
for violating the State law because he continued to cover up the State
motto claiming it offended his religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s
Witness.199
Mr. Maynard sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the
State’s enforcement of his sentencing related to the three offenses.200 The
district court issued an order preventing the State from arresting or
prosecuting Mr. Maynard for violation of the license plate statute.201
On appeal, the Supreme Court began by reiterating that inherent in
the First Amendment’s protection of speech is “the right to speak freely

192

Id. at 634.
Id. at 635–36 (“The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is
whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude
may be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers
committed to any political organization under our Constitution.”).
194
Id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
195
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
196
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706, 711.
197
Id. at 706.
198
Id. at 707.
199
Id. at 707–08.
200
Id. at 708.
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Id. at 709, 711.
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and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”202 The Court defined this
case as one in which the State forced an individual “as part of his daily
life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”203 Important to the
analysis was the recognition that driving a car is nearly a necessity for
most Americans, the State exclusively controls the message on stateissued license plates, and the message is displayed to the public.204 This
relationship between the need to drive and the license plate being
required to do so caused the Court to conclude that New Hampshire, in
effect, used private vehicles as “mobile billboard[s]” to promote
ideological messages.205
After finding the State license plates implicated the First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech, the Court evaluated
whether the license plate regulation survived strict scrutiny.206 The State
offered two interests supporting the regulation: (1) the need to identify
passenger vehicles for effective law enforcement and (2) the desire to
promote history, individualism, and state pride.207 The Court refused to
clearly state whether these interests were sufficiently compelling, instead
finding that the compelled display of the State motto was not narrowly
tailored.208
A third case, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, implicates both
expressive association issues and compelled speech issues.209 For the
purposes of this comment, it highlights important aspects of how an
association imputes speech between members. In this case, members of
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB)
sought inclusion in the annual St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day
Parade.210 The council responsible for managing applications denied the
group a spot in the festivities.211 GLIB filed suit under the State’s public
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Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (“A system which secures the fight to proselytize
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant
right to decline to foster such concepts.”).
203
Id. at 715.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 716.
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Id. at 716–17.
208
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
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Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563, 573–74.
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Id. at 561.
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accommodation law which forbade discrimination based on sexual
orientation.212
The lower court rejected the council’s First Amendment claims,
instead finding the choice to exclude GLIB violated the public
accommodation law.213 In rejecting their claims to freedom of expressive
association, the lower court determined the council and parade did not
enjoy First Amendment protections as a “recreational event,” and even if
they did, the forced inclusion of GLIB only incidentally affected their
rights in light of a legitimate state purpose.214 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld the lower court ruling.215
The Supreme Court first corrected the State courts’ determination
that the parade did not fall within an “expressive association” sufficient
to bring its activity within the First Amendment.216 Instead, the Court
noted that a parade includes “marchers who are making some sort of
collective point” as opposed to a group of people merely walking to get
to a particular destination.217 The coordination of people marching in a
parade together was enough to qualify as an expression; no
“particularized message” was necessary to afford the organizers First
Amendment protections.218 However, each individual unit of the parade
did have a particularized message, and in the case of GLIB it was that of
support for openly gay members of the Irish community.219 As overall
organizers of the parade, the Court determined that forced inclusion of
GLIB would require an “alter[ation] [to] the expressive content of the
parade.”220 Because each individual unit made up a broader message of
the whole, the organizers enjoyed the freedom to not include GLIB.221
Forced inclusion would compel them to speak on a matter they otherwise
chose not to.222
Each of these cases highlight important factors related to compelled
speech issues. In Barnette and Wooley, part of the Court’s analysis
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focused on the ideological nature of the messages being compelled.223
Moreover, the issue of punishment for failure to comply with the
compulsion was severe in Barnette (expulsion)224 and a consideration in
Wooley (tickets, fines, and imprisonment).225 As it relates to divorce,
these cases raise the question of whether there is some ideological
message conveyed in the marriage or divorce. The other question raised
is whether the one-year separation period amounts to some kind of
punishment like the expulsion or fines in Barnette and Wooley. These
questions are addressed in the following section.
C. Compelled Speech and Divorce in North Carolina
There are several ways in which North Carolina compels speech
from couples during the one-year separation period similar to the
situations presented in the aforementioned cases. But first it is necessary
to recognize that there is an ideological nature to the marital relationship.
Marriage is in some ways a contract, but courts are hesitant to leave
the nature of the relationship purely within contractual law
frameworks.226 Although marriage is not a standalone religion, it is just
as central to a person’s identity because it permeates every facet of life—
even more so than religion.227 While even the most fervent churchgoers
may attend a daily service, rarely do members of a religious practice live
with their “church family.” But spouses tend to cohabitate on a daily
basis. Most religions call congregants to offer a small percentage of
funds as a way to support the organization’s activities (10% for
Christians and 2.5% for Muslims).228 But in marriage, most couples
combine income, assets, and property by far more than a small
percentage.229 These points highlight that the marital relationship brings
223

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
225
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 708.
226
McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 126 (1953) (Barnhill, J. concurring) (“Of
course, theologically, marriage is a sacrament, but under the law it is a contract.
. . . It is so basic that the contract of marriage is set apart and treated as one
entirely different from other contracts.”).
227
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (referring to marriage as a “way of life.”).
228
Garcia Rhys Lindmark, How Different Religions Sustain Themselves
Through Self-Taxing, MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://medium.com/@RhysLindmark/how-religions-sustain-themselvesthrough-self-taxing-37fc6ab64de1.
229
Casey Bond, 6 Women Share Why They and Their Spouses Keep Separate
Finances, HUFFPOST (Jul. 2, 2018, 5:45 AM),
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with it the same kinds of ideological concerns the Court considered in
Barnette and Wooley.230 If religious considerations raise heightened
concerns about compelled speech, then marriage should too.
While divorce doesn’t bring about the same kind of punishment
considered in Barnette and Wooley, there are ramifications to not being
able to obtain a divorce. This includes an individual’s inability to enter
into a new romantic relationship for fear of being exposed to a claim of
adultery231 or opening their new partner to civil liability via a heart balm
tort.232 The delay in being able to obtain a divorce can also limit an
individual’s decisions with regards to financial or real property for fear
of adverse judicial rulings in an equitable distribution claim.
1. Changing Names
This issue affects women more than men, as it is culturally more
common for a woman to adopt the surname of her husband (if the couple
is heterosexual). But with the increase in same-sex marriages, some
couples choose to adopt a surname new to both, choose the surname that
sounds the best, or adopt a hyphenated surname that includes both
party’s names.233
Regardless, a separated spouse is not allowed to obtain new
identification until they have a divorce decree.234 The practical effect is a
separated spouse is required by the State to represent themselves in
certain capacities by a surname they no longer identify with. Obviously,
a person is free to “go by” another name colloquially. But when it comes
to a driver license, vehicle registration, taxes, voter registration, and
certain employment forms, the person must continue to use the surname
from a marriage they have separated from.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/women-keep-finances-separatespouses_n_5b35117ee4b0cb56052084b4.
230
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 71-15; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
231
Adams v. Adams, 374 S.E.2d 450, 452-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
232
Malecek, 804 S.E.2d at 595.
233
Patricia Garcia, In a Same-Sex Marriage, Who Gets to Keep Their Name?,
VOGUE (July 30, 2015), https://www.vogue.com/article/same-sex-marriagename-change; An LGBTQ+ Couple’s Guide to Name Changes After Marriage,
THE KNOT (May 21, 2020), https://www.theknot.com/content/same-sexmarriage-name-change.
234
Name Changes: Driver Licenses & IDs, N.C. THE OFF. N.C. DMV WEBSITE,
https://www.ncdot.gov/dmv/help/moving/Pages/name-changes.aspx (last
updated Jan. 4, 2022); Corrected Card for a U.S. Born Adult, SOC. SEC.,
https://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber/ss5doc.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
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Like Wooley, these identification documents are necessary for daily
life in America. One must have a valid driver’s license or state
identification to drive, board a plane, or purchase alcohol. Admittedly,
the public nature of these documents does not amount to a “public
billboard,” but the content of the message is even more central to a
person’s beliefs than religious disagreement with a state motto. Although
Shakespeare might argue otherwise, names carry great weight in the
realm of personal identity—it is why some change their surname upon
marriage in the first place. The shared name signals a change in identity
to that of a spouse. The return to a maiden or pre-marital name is just as
significant.235
2. New Romantic Relationships or Marriages
There is also a question of compelled speech issues with regards to
dating while separated. First, while a couple may be separated, they are
still legally married. Therefore, a partner who enters into a romantic
relationship with a third party during this period may still be liable for
adultery.236 This is true regardless of whether the adulterous relationship
began within one month of separation or eleven months. If the spouse
who did not engage in a romantic relationship can prove adultery, that
may substantially change a court’s determinations for separation of
assets, custody, and alimony.237
Moreover, because North Carolina courts uphold the application of
heart balm torts,238 a party is likely dissuaded from pursuing a new
intimate association for fear that their partner may be sued for one of
these torts. The North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged that
intimate relationships are in some part protected by the First
Amendment.239 But the punishment for engaging in a new romantic
relationship while separated—but not divorced—is the exact kind of
235

North Carolina does provide for a citizen to legally change their name once
absent marriage or divorce. This process requires an application, showing of
cause, and a posting period at the courthouse before the change may take effect.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 101-1 (West 2022).
236
Adams, 374 S.E.2d at 452-53(upholding lower court’s decision to award wife
alimony because her husband entered into a romantic relationship with a third
party after separation) (“[V]oluntary sexual intercourse by a spouse with a third
party during the period of separation [required by statute] is adultery as
contemplated by [the statute], and is a ground for alimony.”).
237
Id.
238
Malecek, 804 S.E.2d at 598-99.
239
Id. at 594.
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“chilling effect” the Court found unconstitutional in the past.240
Moreover, a person cannot get married to a new party while not yet
legally divorced from a former partner.241 This is compelled speech in
that it compels a person to not speak (through a new expressive/intimate
association) on a matter they otherwise would.
3. Speech of a Separated Spouse is the Speech of the Other
Hurley provides an interesting thought experiment, especially in
light of recent political turmoil. If the above analysis is accepted—that
marriage is some form of expressive association—can the State compel
parties to remain married even if one is publicly sharing views the other
refutes? The Court asserted in Hurley that simply by requiring organizers
to admit the homosexual group to the parade roster, organizers were then
compelled to speak on a matter they chose not to.242 The Court’s
analysis, in essence, was that mere inclusion in a group meant adoption
of—or at least acquiescence to—an individual member’s message.243
This framework is important in light of divorce during politically and
racially polarized times. What would the court make of a husband who
files for divorce from a spouse who participated in the insurrection of the
Capitol? Or in a Black Lives Matter protest? By forcing the couple to
remain married, the husband could claim the State is compelling him to
speak in the same way the Court found inclusion of GLIB to be
compelled speech; one spouse is assumed to adopt or affirm the views of
the other by the association between the two.244
240

Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 872, 882-83, (1997) (holding a
federal statute unconstitutional because the heavy burden for transmission of
what was vaguely defined as “obscene or indecent” content amounted to an
impermissible chilling effect).
241
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-2(a)(West 2021)(“All unmarried persons of 18
years, or older, may lawfully marry . . . .”) (emphasis added).
242
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
243
Id. at 572–73 (“Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed
by the private organizers, the state courts’ application of the [public
accommodations] statute produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to
alter the expressive content of their parade.”).
244
This is not an abstract idea. A lawyer in Arizona suffered professional
ramifications after patrons at a gas station videoed his wife berating a person of
color in the store. The wife can be heard in the video telling the other customer
to “go back to your country.” As a result of this viral, racist video, the husband’s
law firm received an onslaught of one-star reviews on Google along with
negative press, phone calls, and e-mails. Joshua Bowling, Husband of woman in
viral video apologizes for her racist scene in phoenix convenience store,

2022]

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

147

WHAT STANDARD OF SCRUTINY IS APPROPRIATE TO APPLY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DIVORCE LAWS?
AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION TO NORTH CAROLINA’S CURRENT
SEPARATION REQUIREMENT
The above discussion focused on the issues with North Carolina’s
divorce scheme as it relates to heightened constitutional scrutiny. But
defining the issue is only part of the process in addressing a problem.
This section lays out various ways North Carolina could amend its
current one-year separation requirement to meet not only the
constitutional burden imposed by the First Amendment, but it also
highlights how these proposed changes better achieve the State’s policy
objectives.
Before offering any solutions, it is vital to remember that the
government’s role in regulating who may get married is limited to age
restrictions, familial connections, and verification both parties are legally
able to marry. This limited role means the government relies on other
social programs, initiatives, and benefits to encourage marriage among
citizens. However, these government initiatives aimed at strengthening
the institution of marriage traditionally do not perform the way policy
makers hoped. A study in 2014 on the effects of the Healthy Marriage
Initiative promulgated by President George W. Bush found that despite
nearly $600 million in spending, divorce rates didn’t move while
marriage rates actually declined.282 Some argue that abandoning the
traditional nuclear family model all together and focusing instead on
strengthening parenting skills would yield better results.283 But this
approach ignores the other ways in which marriage is part of the fabric of
our society; promoting healthy marriages is important even absent the
parental roles many married partners assume. The reasons people enter
into a marriage relationship are vast and can be somewhat complicated.
The reasons people divorce perhaps are even more numerous and
complex. However, the complexities in the divorce decision-making
paradigm do not justify a blanket rule; the State can adopt different

(Jun. 9, 2020, 8:24 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2020/06/09/viral-racistvideo-robert-harrian-apologizes-wife-rant-phoenix-conveniencestore/5331110002/.
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policies to promote marriage, deter divorce, and afford individuals their
constitutional protections.
First, the State should view the divorce problem through the lens of
the age-old adage: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
While it is difficult to distill the reasons couples divorce into statistics
and figures, there are some common threads that lead to divorce such as
the inability to resolve conflict, financial problems, addiction, abuse, and
infidelity.284 Some of these commonalities provide room for the State to
support the pre-marital individual so that they are better prepared for
marriage.
Inability to resolve conflict: Of all the education American
children receive in school, almost none of the curriculum is focused on
conflict resolution.285 That learning curve tends to happen on the
playground, or even now on social media platforms. Moreover, the
training children receive at home on how to resolve conflict is wholly
dependent on the example parents set. If a child has adults at home that
don’t have these tools themselves, it is unlikely the child will learn any
better strategies unless they pursue counseling later in life. If conflict
resolution skills are central to navigating marriage successfully and
reducing divorce rates, the State could consider preventative measures in
the form of education at school or community classes for adults.
Financial problems: Difficulties around money in a marriage are a
derivative of conflict resolution issues. A lack of money, or different
philosophies on how to manage money, are in some ways independent of
communication issues. One idea is to offer money management classes
as part of a life skills curriculum to teach individuals how to better

284

Shellie R. Warren, 10 Most Common Reasons for Divorce, MARRIAGE.COM
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.marriage.com/advice/divorce/10-most-commonreasons-for-divorce/.
285
This isn’t to say there isn’t any curriculum on effective communication. It
can be found under the State’s education category of “healthful living.” But this
particular set of curriculum includes categories about mental health, nutrition,
physical changes during puberty, and alcohol / tobacco use. Only one
educational objective includes conflict resolution, which is listed as part of the
high school health education curriculum. Perhaps the most troubling part is the
objective is to provide students with “strategies for resolving interpersonal
conflict without harming self or others.” Merely preventing physical harm to one
of the parties in conflict sets the bar entirely too low. See North Carolina
Essential Standards: Health Education – High School, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/media/3963/open (last visited Apr. 10,
2022) (emphasis on Clarifying Objective 9.ICR.1.3).
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manage their money before ever becoming spouses. These same classes
can be offered as part of a community initiative to help couples feel more
secure in their financial decision making, or at least offer a better forum
in which to discuss finances.286
Addiction: This is an issue that affects not just marriages, but so
many other facets of society. Addressing addiction at a state-level can
change not just divorce rates, but employment, law enforcement issues,
and public safety.287 State-run addiction treatment facilities sufficient to
address the addiction issues of the general public would be extremely
burdensome and not easily implemented.288 Although these types of
solutions have found success in other parts of the world, a realistic
approach for North Carolina might be an economic incentive to attend a
rehabilitation program. Whether the State offered a tax credit for
successful completion or some kind of stipend to promote attendance,
there are ways to encourage citizens to seek treatment.289
Next, and arguably the most significant, is the State’s interest in
regulating marriage to ensure better outcomes for children. But having
married parents is just one factor in evaluating childhood outcomes.
Instead of an arbitrary separation period to try and enforce marriage, the
State could adopt a holistic approach to addressing how parents affect
childhood outcomes—married or unmarried. Moreover, this would
account for the reality that many Americans are choosing to cohabitate
instead of getting married.290 From 1960 to 2007, the number of
cohabitating couples increased fourteen-fold, while the marriage rate fell
by more than 14% across genders. This co-habitation outside of marriage
increased the number of children born out of wedlock, from 11% in 1970
to 41% in 2010.291 By addressing parenthood outside the context of
marriage, the State can still promote child development. With these
mechanisms in place, the State could relax the separation period

286

None of the state curriculum in the “Healthful Living” programming includes
personal finance management. See Healthful Living, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, https://www.dpi.nc.gov/teach-nc/curriculum-instruction/standardcourse-study/healthful-living (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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requirement because of the lessened impact divorce would have on
childhood outcomes.
Reduce unwanted pregnancy and teen pregnancy: The fact is
that more children are born out of wedlock today than ever before; and
these births are to single women, not wives who later seek a divorce.292
The statistics associated with children growing up in single-parent homes
are equally grim to those for children growing up in divorced-parent
homes. One way to avoid the issue altogether is to ensure women have
access to birth control through education and medical care. While there
are some objections to birth control as a matter of morals or religious
beliefs, the statistics don’t lie. Where women have access to birth
control, there are fewer unwanted pregnancies and abortions.293
Promote education and sentencing reform: One of the reasons
women remain unwed mothers, especially in low-income situations, is
because they do not view the fathers of their children as “marriage
material.”294 This means everything from physical violence to an
inability to provide financially. There are two meaningful approaches to
address this problem of helping men become more available for
marriage: decrease incarceration rates for non-violent offenders and
increase educational opportunities.295 Education and employment
initiatives have already had great success in achieving the State’s
apparent aims. Young men who participated in academic and technical
skills education during high school were 33% more likely to be married,
30% more likely to live with their partners and children, and made more
money than their control group counterparts—$30,000 more on
average.296
Finally, in order to change North Carolina’s separation period such
that the regulation is either the least restrictive on a citizen’s First
Amendment rights or not an undue burden, the State needs to offer a
graduated system for obtaining a divorce that accounts for the various
292

Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Dramatic increase in the proportion of births
outside of marriage in the United States from 1990 to 2016, CHILD TRENDS
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State interests more particularly. This kind of system would amount to a
factors-based approach that moves the separation period depending on
the couple and their justification for seeking divorce. These kinds of
considerations are not totally unheard of; Louisiana already alters the
separation period required depending upon whether the couple has
children.297 Below is a list of potential factors the State could adopt to
implement a factors-based approach.298
Violence: The State can make no rational claim that it has an
interest in promoting a marriage that involves violence. This is the kind
of relationship that fails to promote societal good; in fact, it has a
negative return for communities.299 As such, where a party can make a
showing of violence or abuse, the State should place the least restrictions
on a citizen seeking absolute divorce. A much shorter waiting period—
perhaps one week—better protects the abused spouse and the State’s
interests.
Children: The State could easily make a clear, blanket rule where
children are involved. If a couple does not have children, the State’s
interest in preserving that marriage is much lower for two reasons. First,
the need to promote better childhood outcomes does not exist. Second,
allowing the couple to divorce sooner affords them the opportunity to
enter into potentially more healthy, stable marriages. The State could
keep the one-year separation period if a couple has children to ensure
parents fully consider their choice. Then, the State could adopt a threemonth separation period for childless couples to offer a more efficient
means of dissolving the marriage.
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Infidelity: Most marriages come with the expectation of
monogamy. Where that is the case and a spouse can make a showing of
adultery, the State’s interest again is lowered and the spouse’s liberty
interest is higher. Although many marriage counseling professionals are
skilled at helping couples come back from adultery, the choice to attempt
to do so is ultimately up to the individuals in the relationship.300 If a
spouse can show their partner failed to uphold the expectation of
monogamy, the State should allow for a shorter separation period—
something closer to the three-month mark.
Counseling: The State’s adoption of a no-fault divorce scheme
came in an era where counseling generally was not as widely accepted as
it is today. Seeking counseling for marital issues no longer carries the
same stigma it once had, as evidenced by references to marriage
counseling in pop culture.301 The State’s separation period ostensibly
serves the purpose of ensuring the couple is not able to reconcile. But
this fails to account for the couple that genuinely participated in marriage
counseling during the marriage in an effort to make the relationship
work. If the couple can show they sought counseling for a period of time
and were unable to reconcile, then the State’s purpose of enforcing a
separation period no longer applies. The State should provide some
evidence-based approach to allow a couple to comply with a much
shorter separation period because they already attempted reconciliation
and a one-year separation will serve no reconciliatory purpose.
Financial stability and property disbursement: One of the
difficulties in dissolving a marriage is accounting for the property
interests of each spouse as well as the financial impact divorce may have
where one spouse is dependent on the other’s financial provision.
However, the prevalence of pre- and post-nuptial agreements as well as
separation agreements provide an avenue for couples to make these types
of disbursements with little input from the courts. The State might argue
that the one-year separation period ensures parties to a divorce have time
to think about or prepare for the division of assets or change in finances.
But where parties are able to abide by the terms of a pre- or post-nuptial
agreement, or where the parties agree to a separation agreement, the oneyear separation period does little to aid in this divisional process. The
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State could lower the separation period for those couples who have all of
their financial ducks in a row, so to speak.
Uncontested: Arguably the violation of a citizen’s constitutional
rights is highest when both parties to the divorce agree to the divorce but
cannot obtain one because of the State’s separation hurdle. If both parties
want a divorce, then the State’s interest is least served by enforcing a
lengthy separation. The State should consider a significant reduction in
the separation period when both parties affirm their desire to divorce.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects a citizen’s freedom of expressive
association, freedom of intimate association, and freedom from
compelled speech. North Carolina’s current separation requirement
violates those protections because it is neither narrowly tailored nor free
of undue burden. Moreover, the current scheme fails to truly promote
North Carolina’s objective of protecting and promoting marriage. There
are less restrictive means for the State to pursue these objectives that
would likely produce a better result by addressing those common
problems that cause couples to divorce, without violating a divorcing
couples’ First Amendment rights.

